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INTRODUCTION 
The Dove Foundation, a nonprofit organization with the self-described 
mission of "encourag[ing] and promot[ing] the creation, production and 
distribution of wholesome family entertainment'" recently completed a study 
examining the revenue and costs for the 3,000 MPAA-rate theatrical films 
released between January 1, 1989 and December 31, 2004-a follow-up study 
of its ten-year study of movies released between 1988 and 1997. The Dove 
Foundation's most recent study confirms the findings of its original study: G-
rated movies are more profitable than R-rated movies. Dick Roile, the group's 
founder and chairman said, "'While the movie industry produced nearly 
[twelve] times more R-rated films than G-rated films from 1989 [to] 2003, the 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. B.A., Yale University; 
J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author served as an attorney-advisor for the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in both the Media and Common Carrier Bureaus. 
I. See Dove Foundation, http://www.dove.orgIFrames.asp?URL=partnersifamilies.htm 
(last visited July I I, 2005). 
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average G-rated film produced [eleven] times greater profit than its R-rated 
counterpart. ,,,2 
While some question the study's fmdings,3 some argue that the data 
shows that markets under-provide programming attractive to children and 
families. For instance, the noted movie critic and social commentator Michael 
Medved states that: '''For several decades, Hollywood has tried to ignore the 
increasingly overwhelming evidence that edgy, adult-themed entertainment 
usually constitutes a bad investment and a sucker bet at the box office. 
Meanwhile, the Dove Foundation has contributed significantly to making the 
case that family-friendly fare represents good business .... ",4 
What makes Medved's claim difficult to accept from an economic 
perspective is its assumption that the enormous, multi-billion dollar 
Hollywood-entertainment complex, with its countless analysts, marketing 
experts, and, above all, its demanding investors, is run sub-optimally. It 
would seem that if it really were the case that the Hollywood studios could 
make more money simply by producing more G-rated films and fewer R-rated, 
they would. Such totally child-friendly production firms would quickly 
become the most profitable and attract the largest number of investors. 
What would make the Dove Foundation's research and Medved's claims 
more convincing from an economic and legal-regulatory perspective is if they 
could point to some feature in the structure of the entertainment market that 
creates the supposed underinvestment. In other words, is there some feature 
in the entertainment market or its regulation that would induce a perfectly 
wealth-maximizing firm to under-invest in children and family programming, 
despite the existence of demand for such programming? 
At the same time, Medved and the Dove Foundation's research do speak 
to the sense that the demand for child-friendly programming is insufficiently 
met in the current media environment. Drawing on that sense, we ask that 
question in the context of advertisement-supported broadcast media, 
2. Brian Fuson, Study: G-rated fare more profitable, BUSINESS WORLD ONLINE, 
http://bworldonline.net/Weekender070105/cinema3.php (last visited July II, 2005); see also 
Dove Foundation, Profitability of MPAA-Rated Movies for Movies Released Between 1989-
2003, http://www.dove.orgiresearch/DoveFoundationROI-Study2005.pdf(last visited July II, 
2005). 
3. See, e.g., Peter Johnson, Stern Says He'll Push for Kerry, USA TODAY, July I, 
2004, at D3.; John Dunbar, Indecency on the Air: Shock-Radio Jock Howard Stern Remains 
"King of All Fines", CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.publicintegrity 
.org/te\ecom/report.aspx?aid=239&sid=200; Editorial, Powell Overreacting to Indecency Issue, 
TELEVISION WEEK, Jan. 26,2004, at 9. 
4. Dove Foundation, supra note 2, at II. 
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examining its market structure-and particularly its extensive regulatory 
regime-to see whether it could be enhanced to better serve this demand. 
In this Essay, I examine current FCC regulation and propose a new 
approach to encouraging child-friendly broadcast media, drawing on our 
recent analysis of indecency regulation.5 The three maj or current regulations 
to protect children-FCC age-specific television programming requirements, 
obscenity/indecency regulation, and the V -chip media filter for violent 
programming-have all proved limited tools. Beyond their limited ability to 
effect real change in programming, they often seem, as I will discuss, more 
responsive to bureaucratic and political gamesmanship than actual community 
standards or demand. I, therefore, propose a new, market-based approach.6 
Broadcasters make their money from advertising; the more viewers or 
listeners (a.k.a. "eyeballs") they deliver to advertisers, the more they can 
charge. Thus, ABC can charge huge amounts for advertising time during the 
Super Bowl, but your local UHF channel can charge significantly less for 
reruns of Three's Company. The economic transaction is not only between 
broadcasters and consumers, as the traditional regulatory framework assumes, 
but between consumers' time (the value of which is pegged to their 
opportunity costs) and advertisers' provision of programming via 
broadcasters. 
In economic terms, broadcasting markets display "two-sidedness." As 
described by two leading economists, "Two-sided ... markets are roughly 
defined as markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions 
between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides 'on board' by 
appropriately charging each side."7 Thus, broadcasters, in fact, serve two 
markets: viewers and advertisers at the same time, and success with one group 
of consumers, i.e., viewers, has positive externalities with the other group, 
advertisers. Traditional broadcasting regulation concentrates on one side of 
the market. Perhaps as a result, it is the broadcaster who has been able to take 
sole advantage of the value of the eyeballs, with no advantage to the eyeball 
owners themselves. 
This Article maintains that child-friendly broadcast regulation must take 
into account both sides of the transaction-so as to permit the "eyeball owners" . 
5. See Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics 0/ Wardrobe 
Malfunction, BYU L REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=787928. 
6. We provide a more extensive discussion of these issues in The Law and Economics 
a/Wardrobe Malfunction. 
7. lean-Charles Rochet & lean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview 2 (Institut 
d'Economie Industrielle, Working Paper No. 275, 2004), available at http://idei.fr/doc/ 
by/tirolelrochet_ tirole. pdf. 
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to bargain with their advertisers in order to get more than programming in 
return for listening to their commercials, i.e., to gain a more direct voice in 
determining programming content. The FCC could easily encourage this 
mechanism by requiring all programs to explicitly state the entities that 
advertise and make their addresses/contact information easily accessible, 
probably on the Internet. In this way, if enough parents and child advocates 
were sufficiently outraged by certain programming, they could express their 
displeasure not simply at the broadcaster but directly to all companies that 
support such broadcasting. They could also express to advertisers their desire 
for more child-friendly programming. The FCC, simply by furnishing and 
collecting this information, could lower the transaction costs involved for 
parents and child advocates to communicate and organize and thereby use 
their bargaining power to deal directly with advertisers for child-friendly 
programmmg. 
This market -based mechanism could encourage markets to respond to the 
demand for child-friendly programming-and to the anger that the lack of it 
induces in many. It could do so with a greatly reduced reliance upon the 
federal bureaucracy or legal system. Such a market -based mechanism requires 
advertisers to evaluate parents' and child advocates' complaints and concerns 
and the threat that they may avoid their products if they support particularly 
child-unfriendly programming or fail to support child-friendly programming. 
By gathering and making public information on advertisers, the FCC's role 
would be analogous to that of the FDA in ensuring the accuracy of food 
labeling or that of the NEPA's environmental impact regime, which requires 
disclosure of a project's impact on the environment for the purpose of 
informing public debate on government activities. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the three main types of 
broadcast regulation intended to protect children: FCC age-specific television 
programming requirements, obscenity/indecency regulation, and the V -chip 
media filter. It will discuss their limitations and propose that they should be 
altered or augmented. Part II introduces the theory of the two-sided market 
and explains its application to broadcasting regulation. Further, the Article 
will discuss how the FCC could make information about advertisers easily 
accessible to viewers/listeners and explain the legal bases for such a 
regulatory role. The concluding section shows how such an information-based 
regulatory regime might not only make broadcast media more child-friendly, 
but also further the goals of civic society. 
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I. THE THREE MAJOR REGULATORY REGIMES THAT PURPORT TO FURTHER 
CHILD-FRIENDLY BROADCAST MEDIA: Do THEY REALLY RESPOND TO 
PARENTS'CONCERNS? 
Three major broadcast regulatory regimes are intended to protect 
children. First, there are the FCC age-specific programming requirements, 
which encourage children's television programming. Second, there is the 
obscenitylindecency regulation which prohibits the broadcasting-on publicly 
licensed television or radio frequency-of certain material involving sexual or 
excretory functions. Third, the federally mandated V -chip allows parents to 
screen violent programming. 
As discussed below, the first two regimes-mandating children's 
television programming material and obscenity/indecency regulation-have 
been politicized significantly and arguably fail to respond effectively to 
community standards of what is appropriate for children. In fact, all three 
regimes, including the V -chip, simply attempt to control or limit the 
production or distribution of broadcast material. They concentrate solely on 
the viewer-broadcaster relationship rather than create a regulatory structure 
that is arguably more responsive to consumer demand, as we advocate. This 
Section will examine these three regimes, pointing to their limited ability to 
foster a truly child-friendly regime. 
A. The Children's Television Act of 1990: Deals and the First Amendment 
The Children's Television Act of 1990 (CTA)S has two main 
requirements. First, cable operators and commercial television broadcast 
licensees must limit the amount of commercial matter in children's television 
programming to not more than ten and a half minutes per hour on weekends 
and not more than twelve minutes per hour on weekdays.9 Second, through 
its review of television broadcast renewal applications, the FCC must consider 
whether commercial television licensees have "served the educational and 
informational needs of children through the licensee's overall programming, 
including programming specifically designed to serve such needs."lo The 
CT A itself did not require any specific amount of time to be devoted to 
children's television, nor did it define what constitutes children's 
broadcasting. II Its initial implementing regulations stated that licensees that 
8. Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified 
at 47 U.S.c. §§ 303a, 303b (1990». 
9. Id. at § 303a(b). 
10. 47 U.S.c. § 303b(a)(2). See 47 C.F.R. § 73.670 (2005). 
II. See 47 U.S.c. §§ 303a, 303b, 394 (2000). 
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aired at least one half-hour program per week would receive staff-level 
approval of the CTA portion of their renewal applications-but never stated 
with specificity what constitutes children's programming.12 
The CTA initially failed completely and, by many accounts, risibly. 
During its first few years of existence, television stations claimed that reruns 
of The Jetsons, The Flintstones, and Leave It to Beaver qualified as meeting 
the educational and informational needs of children. 13 Similarly, broadcasters 
claimed that afternoon talk shows discussing sexual topics were serving 
educational needs. 14 They also scheduled educational programming in the pre-
dawn time slotS. 15 
Seizing upon a mini-initiative, which one supposes was perceiving as 
having powerful appeal to "soccer moms" and other purportedly vital 
demographic groups, the Clinton Administration, through its FCC Chairman 
Reed Hundt, began efforts to strengthen the rules in 1996.16 Under its new 
rules, adopted in 1996 and made effective in 1997, the FCC encourages, but 
does not require, television broadcasters to air three hours of educational 
children's programming per week.17 This "encouragement" works in the 
following manner: Broadcasters will receive almost automatic approval ofthe 
CT A portion of their renewal applications if they air three hours per week of 
what the FCC terms "core educational programming.,,18 Alternatively, a 
broadcaster can receive almost automatic renewal by showing that it has aired 
a package of different types of educational and informational programming 
that, while containing somewhat less than three hours per week of core 
programming, demonstrates a level of commitment to educating and informing 
12. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, 
Revision of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 8 F.C.C.R. 1841, ~~ 6-7 
(1993). 
13. INST. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, GEO. U. L. CTR., A REPORT ON STATION 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE C}flWREN'S TELEVISION ACT (1992). 
14. See Edmund L. Andrews, Broadcasters, to Satisfy Law, Define Cartoons as 
Education, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1992, at A\3. 
15. Robin Schatz, Tough Crowd Broadcasters struggle to keep the FCC. kids and 
advertisers happy, NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 1994, at 92 (educational programming "aired ... very 
early in the morning"). 
16. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, II 
F.C.C.R. 10,660, 10,728-33 (1996); see also Reed E. Hundt, A New Paradigmfor Broadcast 
Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 527 (1996). The new regulations were described as a "compromise 
agreement ... brokered by Clinton Administration officials in a long weekend of arm-twisting 
that preceded ... [the] children's television summit at the White House." Lawrie Mimin, u.s. 
Mandates Educational TV for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A16. 
17. See II F.C.C.R. at 10,728-33. 
18. Id. 
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children that is at least equivalent to airing three hours per week of core 
programming. 19 Licensees not meeting this guideline will be referred to the 
FCC for consideration, where they will have a full opportunity to demonstrate 
their compliance with the CTA.20 Given that a broadcaster without a license 
is out-of-business and quickly becomes a former broadcaster, this 
encouragement was quite a powerful motivator. 
The FCC, in order to avoid the problem of broadcasters claiming The 
Jetsons constitutes education about advanced technology, required that the 
children's programming be "core programming."21 Its requirements defined 
"core programming" as meeting the following criteria: (1) the program serves 
the educational and informational needs of children ages sixteen and under as 
a significant purpose; (2) the educational and informational objective of the 
program and the target child audience are specified in writing in the 
Children's Television Programming Report; (3) the program is aired between 
the hours of7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.; (4) the program is a regularly scheduled 
(five days) weekly program of at least thirty minutes in duration; and (6) the 
program is identified as educational and informational in the Children's 
Television Programming Report prepared by commercial stations, and those 
stations must instruct program guide publishers to list the program as 
educational/informational (EII).22 
By "encouraging" specific hours to be devoted to educational 
programming and defining educational programming with some specificity, 
the new 1996 regulations constituted a dramatic departure from previous 
enforcement and a significant increase in the regulatory oversight of 
broadcasters. However, it is far from clear whether, in fact, these regulations 
have changed things all that much. A 1999 study by the Annenberg Public 
Policy Center found that one-fourth of programming presented as educational 
had "no enriching content," which was considered a "modest" improvement 
over the pre-1990 numbers.23 This study echoes findings of other researchers 
that the new rules had no effect on the value of programming and that, in fact, 





23. EMORY H. WOODARD, IV, THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE 1999 STATE OF CHILDREN'S TELEVISION REPORT: 
PROGRAMMING FOR CHILDREN OVER BROADCAST AND CABLE TELEVISION (1999), available al 
http://annenbergpubl icpol icycenter. org/05 _media _ developing_chi Idlchildrensprogrammi ng/ 
rep28.pdf. See also Kevin Harris, PiClure lsn 'I Bleakfor Kid's TV, Siudy Says, DENV. POST, 
June 29, 1999, at AI. 
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that "investigations of the educational strength of children's programs, based 
on evaluations of the primary lessons of Ell programs (e.g., lesson clarity, 
integration, involvement, and applicability) demonstrated that the educational 
value of the ElI shows actually declined from the 1996-1997 to the 
1998-1999 sample of Ell programs. ,,24 
Indeed, while politicians and FCC officials are eager to take credit for 
instituting change, they do not seem to have the will to force broadcasters to 
vigorously~r even sincerely-pursue the goals of the CT A. The FCC has 
never denied a license renewal or even challenged a station for failing to meet 
the educational requirements. As Barbara Kreisman, chief of the FCC's video 
services division, said, "'We don't like to get involved with issues of quality 
.... ' 'We defer to the judgment of broadcasters .... ",25 
The enforcement of the Children's Television Act seems to support the 
dark speculations of former FCC chief economist Thomas Hazlett, that 
broadcasters' acquiescence and willingness to support the 1997 rules were in 
exchange for the free digital spectrum they were given in the late 1990s.26 
Consistent with the notion of a deal is that broadcasters never challenged the 
1997 rules implementing the CT A in court-despite convincing arguments that 
these rules run afoul of the First Amendment. The FCC justified these rules, 
relying on the famous Supreme Court case Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC,27 on the grounds that because broadcast spectrum is scarce, it can be 
regulated to a much higher degree.28 
Courts, however, view specific program requirements, like those 
contained in the 1997 implementation of the CT A, with great suspicion, and 
the Supreme Court and lower courts have been distancing themselves from at 
least a broad reading of Red Lion. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has said that 
requirements for broadcasters to carry specific content, at least under the 
public interest requirement, create the "high risk that such rulings will reflect 
the Commission's selection among tastes, opinions, and value judgments . 
. . . [and] must be closely scrutinized lest they carry the Commission too far 
24. Sandra L. Calvert & Jennifer A. Kotler, Lessonsfrom Children's Television: The 
Impact of the Children 's Television Act on Children's Learning, 24 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOl. 275, 279 (2003). 
25. Meg James, TV Networks Find Ways to Stretch Educational Rules, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 2002, at AI. 
26. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Prime Time: Clinton's Do-Bad TV Policy, REASON, Oct. 
1996, at 66, available at http://reason.com/9610/col.haz1ett.shtml. 
27. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
28. See I J F.C.C.R. at 10,728-33 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 
( 1969». 
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in the direction of the forbidden censorship.,,29 Similarly, the Supreme Court 
has recently said that "the FCC's oversight responsibilities do not grant it the 
power to ordain any particular type of programming that must be offered by 
broadcast stations. "30 At the very least, broadcasters probably would have had 
a close call in the courts if they had challenged the law-but they did not.31 
B. Indecency: What Do Community Standards Have to Do with It? 
The Supreme Court, in the famous FCC v. Pacifica Foundation case,32 
ruled that the First Amendment permits the FCC to prohibit "indecent" 
broadcasting, upholding the constitutionality of federallaws-dating from the 
1920s-that prohibit the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane" 
language.33 It described indecency as "nonconformance with accepted 
standards of morality" and involving "patently offensive reference to 
excretory and sexual organs and activities," but conceded that the concept of 
indecency "requires consideration of a host of variables. ,,34 
Moving away from the public trustee doctrine, the Court based its 
upholding of the indecency prohibitions on the grounds that broadcast is 
uniquely persuasive and "is uniquely accessible to children.,,35 Thus, the 
modem conception of the indecency standard proceeds largely from concern 
about children. 
While the indecency prohibitions no doubt do limit the amount and 
explicitness of material dealing with excretory and sexual organs on broadcast 
media, they have proven unstable and highly politicized standards that do not 
represent a thoughtful policy to protect children or encourage a child-friendly 
broadcast medium. As discussed elsewhere36 in greater detail, and as outlined 
below, the political expediency of the moment has motivated the FCC's 
indecency policy. It has proven a highly awkward, ineffective, and often 
destructive tool in protecting children. 
29. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
30. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 650 (1994). 
31. The Practice Group, A Discussion of Current Issues in the Practice of 
Communications Law, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 213, 221 (1998) ("We should be very 
concerned about the whole content regulation aspect from the First Amendment perspective. 
I'm not sure that if someone had brought a good appeal of the Children's Television Act it 
would have passed [c]onstitutional muster."). 
32. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
33. See Radio Act of 1927, Ch. 169,44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934). 
34. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740, 743, 750. 
35. /d. at 728. 
36. See generally Brown & Candeub, supra note 5. 
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Implementing section 1466 of Title 18 of the Criminal Code that 
prohibits the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane" language, section 
73.3999 of the FCC states, "No licensee of a radio or television broadcast 
station shall broadcast . . . any material which is indecent. ,m The FCC 
currently defines indecency in the following manner: "language or material 
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured 
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory activities or organs. ,,38 The Commission uses a community standard 
that is not region-specific, but reflects "an average broadcast viewer or 
listener" in the United States.39 The Commission considers the allegedly 
indecent utterance in context.40 In making its indecency determinations, the 
Commission weighs three factors: 
( I) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of sexual or 
excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells on or repeats at length 
descriptions of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (3) whether the material 
appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether the material appears to have been 
presented for its shock value. 41 
The FCC itself does not view broadcasts trying to detect indecent 
material. Instead, its enforcement process depends solely upon complaints 
received from the public. The FCC requires that these complaints include a 
tape of the offending program, the date and time of the broadcast, and the call 
sign of the station involved.42 In most instances, the Enforcement Bureau of 
the FCC will recommend an appropriate disposition. This might involve 
denial of the complaint, issuance of a "Letter of Inquiry" seeking further 
information, issuance of a "Notice of Apparent Liability" (NAL) for monetary 
forfeiture, or a formal referral to the Commissioners (the five political 
appointees who lead the FCC).43 If the Enforcement Bureau issues an NAL, 
the licensee may respond to the NAL.44 With the response in the 
37. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2005). 
38. In re Industry Guidance On the Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.c. 
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 
F.C.C.R. 7999, 8000 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Policy Statement) (citing Enforcement of 
Prohibitions against Broadcast Indecency in 18 u.s.c. § 1464,8 F.C.C.R. 704 n.1 0 (1993». 
39. 2001 Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8002. 
40. /d. at 8001. 
41. /d. at 8003 (emphasis added). 
42. ld. at 8015. 
43. /d. See also Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at II). 
44. 2001 Policy Statement, supra note 38, at 8016. 
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administrative record, the FCC then can impose a monetary penalty by issuing 
a "Forfeiture Order.,,45 If the FCC issues a forfeiture, a licensee can seek 
reconsideration at the FCC or refuse to pay the fine and challenge the order 
directly in district court.46 
The problems with this mechanism are both substantive and procedural. 
On a substantive level, the standard for indecency is simply too vague for the 
FCC to administer it in a way that avoids politicization and the resulting 
arbitrary and unpredictable application of the law. On a procedural level, the 
complaint process seems designed to allow specific groups to direct the FCC's 
enforcement policy. 
Substantively, the FCC's interpretation of the indecency standard has 
been guided by politics rather than by any reasoned understanding of 
indecency or the effects of indecency on children. We discuss the 
development of this standard in detail elsewhere,47 but it is enough to note 
here its significant steps. . 
From its creation in 1934 to the early 1970s, the FCC rarely enforced the 
indecency standards. This changed in the Pacifica case. On Tuesday, 
October 30, 1973, WBAI played a twelve-minute sequence from George 
Carlin's album "Occupation: Foole" that was about four-letter words and that 
mentioned the seven words "you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves.,,48 
The Commission received a complaint from a John R. Douglas, who, in the 
words of the Supreme Court, 
stated that he heard the broadcast while driving with his young son, [and] wrote a letter 
complaining to the Commission. He stated that, although he could perhaps understand 
the "record's being sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of 
same over the air that, supposedly, you control."49 
John R. Douglas was not a random citizen but was a member of the 
national planning board of Morality in Media, a conservative political group. 50 
As Lucas Powe argues, Douglas's complaint may have been a calculated effort 
to achieve certain legal and political aims-not a result of spontaneous listener 
outrage.51 Powe points to Douglas's six-week delay in submitting his 
45. /d. See a/so Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at 12). 
46. 2001 Policy Statement, supra note 38, at 8016. 
47. See Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at 19-25). 
48. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROAOCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 186 
(1987). 
49. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,730 (1978). 
50. See Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at 18). 
51. See POWE, supra note 48, at 160-210. 
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complaint and his description of his fifteen-year-old as his "young son" as 
evidence that Douglas probably did not even hear the broadcast. 52 Regardless, 
at that time the FCC was controlled by Republicans appointed by Richard 
Nixon, and already the conservative religious elements were gaining power 
within the party. 53 
However, when the appeal process finally ended and the Supreme Court 
ruled in 1978, the administration and the bureaucracy had changed. The FCC, 
now dominated by democratic Carter-appointees, chose a very limited 
approach to the indecency regulation, merely prohibiting a handful of 
words-largely those that Carlin satirized in the dialogue that set off the whole 
case. 54 Mark Fowler, Reagan's appointee to the FCC chairmanship, continued 
this approach, motivated largely by his own ideological de-regulatory 
conviction. 55 
Under Fowler's successor, Dennis R. Patrick, however, there was a 
dramatic shift. The FCC adopted regulations of generalized standards of 
indecency, which were the direct antecedents of the current rules discussed 
above. Broadcasters challenged these rules in court, and the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit upheld them in 1995.56 At that time, the political climate 
had shifted yet again, and the rules were returned to an FCC dominated by 
Clinton appointees. 57 
Under the Clinton presidency and his FCC chairmen, Reed Hundt and 
William Kennard, there were some decency fines imposed, most notably those 
directed at Howard Stem, who was fined. $1.7 million in 1995.58 The total 
amounts remained relatively constant, however, with total yearly NALs 
ranging between $25,500 and $49,000 during the second Clinton 
Administration.59 However, with the George W. Bush Administration and the 
chairmanship of Michael Powell, the indecency enforcements skyrocketed. 
From the beginning of his term, Powell increased the amount in his first year 
from $48,000 to $91,000.60 In 2004, the last full year of his service, the FCC 
52. See id. at 186. 
53. See id. at 165-66, 174. 
54. See Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at 18-19). 
55. See id. 
56. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en bane). 
57. See Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at 24). 
58. See id. at 25. 
59. Federal Communications Commission, Indecency Complaints and NALs: /993-
2004 (Mar. 4, 2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/eblbroadcastlichart.pdf. 
60. /d. 
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fined broadcasters an astounding $7,928,080-more than in the ten prior years 
combined.61 
What is striking about the Powell enforcements of the indecency 
regulations-and demonstrative of its substantive weakness-is that they have 
muddied rather than clarified the scope of language prohibited on broadcast. 
The FCC is far more interested in responding to political pressure than in 
crafting clear standards. Consider the Bono case, where the famed singer, 
during his televised acceptance speech at the Golden Globe Awards, used the 
phrase "fu--ing brilliant. ,,62 
Under the existing regulations set forth above, the exclamation could not 
be indecent; it fails all the prongs mentioned above. First, the comment was 
not "explici[t] or graphic ... [in the] depiction of sexual or excretory organs 
or activities."63 Bono clearly did not use the word "f---" to describe any 
bodily function, but rather he used it merely to add emphasis to the word 
"brilliant.,,64 For better or worse, "fu--ing" in modem usage has a meaning 
independent from any reference to carnal knowledge. The FCC simply 
ignored this reality. Second, Bono did not repeat at length descriptions of 
sexual or excretory organs or activities; his reference to sexual activity-if it 
was a reference-was fleeting. 65 Third, Bono's usage was not titillating or, by 
most standards, shocking. 
The Commission, reversing its own Enforcement Bureau, which found 
no indecency violation, concluded that Bono's comment was "indecent."66 
First, it stated that the word "fu--ing," in "any use of that word or a variation, 
in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation .... "67 Second, the 
Commission essentially eliminated the requirement that sexual descriptions 
be repetitive and non-fleeting, stating that, "While prior Commission and staff 
action have indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the' F -Word' such 
as that here are not indecenct or would not be acted upon, ... we conclude 
that any such interpretation is no longer good law. ,,68 Finally, the Commission 
61. Id. 
62. In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of 
the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19859, ~ 2 (2003). 
63. In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of 
the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, ~ 7 (2004). 
64. See 18 F.C.C.R. 19859 at ~ 2,5. 
65. See id. 
66. See 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 at ~ 17. 
67. Id. at ~ 8. 
68. /d. at~ 12. 
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had little trouble declaring that the word fit the third requirement-that of 
shock or titillation.69 
Beyond bending the indecency standard into contortions, the 
Commission also found the term "fu--ing brilliant" to be "profane.,,70 
Historically, drawing on the long accepted legal meaning of "profane," the 
Commission had understood the term to refer to blasphemous material-and 
had not enforced the word in decades.71 Indeed, the restrictive use of profane 
to blasphemy is uncontroversial, as its definition in Black's Law Dictionary 
shows.72 The Commission explained its radical departure on the flimsy 
grounds that nothing in those cases suggests either that the statutory definition 
of profane is limited to blasphemy, or that the Commission could not also 
apply a broader definition of profanity adopted once by the Seventh Circuit. 73 
While the FCC is certainly correct that its precedent never explicitly 
rejected an expanded notion of "profane," it would seem that an agency would 
have to explain why it was engaging in such a radical departure in its 
understanding of its statute, as opposed to merely noting that precedent does 
not explicitly foreclose the possibility. That the FCC did not do. Combined 
with its contorted definition of indecency-and the political outcry that 
accompanied Bono's comment-the FCC's action supports what many 
observers and commentators have concluded: Politics-and not legality-was 
the FCC's overriding concem.74 This, in tum, suggests that the FCC's 
indecency standards do not represent a well thought out policy to protect 
children. 
C. The V-Chip 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act mandates that "V -chips" be installed 
in all television sets "shipped in interstate commerce or manufactured in the 
United States" that are thirteen inches or larger along the diagona1.7s These 
chips can read ratings embedded in programming content and screen out 
69. Id. at ~ 8. 
70. Id. at ~ 13. 
71. See id. at ~ 14 ("We recognize that the Commission's limited case law on profane 
speech has focused on what is profane in the context of blasphemy .... "). 
72. Black's Law Dictionary defines "profane" as "[ (o]f speech or conduct) irreverent 
to something held sacred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1246 (8th ed. 2004). While Black's 
admits that "profanity" can include "[ 0 ]bscene, vulgar, or insulting language," id., section 1464 
prohibits "protlme" language, not profanity. See 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 at ~ 4. 
73. See 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 at ~ 4. 
74. See Charles Pierce, Hot Button Issue with the FCC, B. GLOBE, July 18,2004, at 9. 
75. 47 U.S.c. § 303(x) (1997). 
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programs with ratings viewers do not want. Thus, for instance, if a program 
identifies itself as having more violence than the amount set by the viewer, 
then that program will be blocked. Due to First Amendment concerns, the Act 
did not mandate broadcasters to label their programming-rather, broadcasters 
were "persuaded" to do SO.76 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
create[d] an almost irresistible set of pressures on private industry to create and 
implement a voluntary ratings system . . . [by requiring] "distributors of video 
programming" ... to come up with a workable ratings system acceptable to the FCC, 
"in consultation with appropriate public interest groups and interested individuals from 
the private sector."77 
Thus, the FCC used its power over its regulated industries, like broadcast and 
cable, to "voluntarily" adopt a ratings system. The TV ratings system codifies 
six age levels (Y, Y7, G, PG, 14, MA) with content descriptors ("V" for 
violence, "S" for sexual situation, "L" for language, and "D" for suggestive 
dialogue).78 
The V -chip's effectiveness has been questioned. As Thomas Hazlett has 
written, "[T]he joke has always been that mom and dad will be unable to 
deploy any filtering device that requires programming skills without 
persuading their lO-year-old to show them how."79 A recent study by the 
Annenberg Center suggests that the overwhelming majority of families would 
not use the V -chip even if given extensive technical support. 80 
II. ADVERTISERS AND MEDIA MARKETS 
As we discuss elsewhere,81 the FCC's focus on content regulation stems 
from an almost century-old set of assumption~ concerning the licensee and the 
76. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1544 n.294 (2005). 
77. J.M. Balkin, Media Filters. The V-Chip. and The Foundations of Broadcast 
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1157 (1996). 
78. FCC Fact Sheet, Cable Television Information Bulletin (June 2000), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html. 
79. Thomas Hazlett, Requiemfor the V-Chip: A relic of the last battle over indecency 
on TV, SLATE, Feb. 13, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2095396. 
80. AMY JORDAN & EMORY WOODARD, THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER OF 
THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, PARENTS' USE OFTHE V-CHIP TO SUPERVISE CHILDREN'S 
TELEVISION USE (2003), available at http://annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/05_media_ 
developing_chi Id/chi Idrensprogramming/2003 _ Parentsuseofvch ip. pdf. 
81. See Brown & Candeub, supra note 5 (manuscript at 47). 
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viewer. Broadcast regulation rests on the assumption of government 
ownership of the airwaves.82 Licensees, therefore, can only use spectrum 
under conditions set forth by the government, conditions that the government 
enforces. 83 This focus is seen in the FCC's regulation intended to protect 
children, where the FCC regulates broadcasters (or cable companies) for the 
supposed benefit of viewers. The children's programming requirements, the 
indecency regulations, even the V -chip all regulate broadcasters for the benefit 
of the pUblic-with the FCC acting as enforcer in the public interest. Yet, as 
shown above, FCC regulation does not seem responsive to public interest. Is 
there another approach that is more responsive to what viewers, in fact, want, 
rather than one that requires the FCC to attempt to determine what people 
want? 
These regulatory schemes view the broadcaster and viewers in a vacuum, 
and they fail to consider perhaps the most important factor in the media 
market: the advertisers. As we describe elsewhere,84 broadcasting displays 
what economists term "two-sidedness." Firms in two-sided markets face two 
different sets of consumers, and each set of consumers affects the desirability 
of the product for the other set of consumers. Consider the retail industry. It 
is a two-sided market: On one side (the one with which we are most familiar), 
retailers sell things, such as clothes, TV s, food, etc., to consumers. On the 
other side, they provide "business" to credit card companies in the form of 
providing a place where consumers use credit cards.8s 
Similarly, taking into account the relationship of the two sides of the 
market, a broadcaster generally will optimize over both sides in the following 
way. The broadcaster charges advertisers an explicit price for commercial 
time, i.e., a price for a minute of commercial on a given show. A television 
broadcaster also charges viewers for watching. This price is implicit, as it is 
the amount of commercial time that viewers endure. This time is not an 
unquantifiable into price. Rather, it can be priced in a rough way to each 
viewer's opportunity costs: The value of the opportunities the viewer foregoes 
in order to watch a commercial is the price he or she pays for a television 
show. 
One simple way to understand the economics of broadcast television is 
that advertisers pay for programming and bundle commercials with the 
programming. Viewers pay advertisers for the programming through their 
82. See id. at 33. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 45. 
85. See id. 
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willingness to watch the commercials. In this sense, the broadcaster is simply 
a conduit for the exchange between advertisers and viewers.86 
Comprehending this relationship between broadcasters, viewers, and 
advertisers enables us to realize that content regulation must not focus 
exclusively on the relationship between viewers and programmers, but should 
also include the relationship between viewers and advertisers. After all, as 
noted above, broadcasters act as the conduit of exchange between advertisers 
and viewers. Involving advertisers in content regulation may therefore be just 
as important as-if not more important than-involving broadcasters. In 
addition, advertisers want viewers who are receptive to their advertisements. 
To the extent that advertisers can learn which content makes viewers less 
receptive to their advertisements, advertisers could obtain value from being 
involved with content regulation. 
In other words, if this advertiser information were cheaply supplied, 
consumers might change their viewing (and purchasing) behavior so as to 
"punish" advertisers who support indecent programming in a way analogous 
to consumers refusing to patronize certain restaurants that fail to accept 
certain credit cards. 
The FCC would have the authority to mandate broadcasters to provide 
information about advertisers who buy commercial time from them under the 
broad authority of sections 4(i)87 and 303(j)88 of the Communications Act of 
1934. These sections empower the Commission to promulgate general rules 
for broadcasters and require recordkeeping.89 
The Commission, in the past, has required broadcasters to keep 
information about its advertisers pursuant to its program log rules. Indeed, 
"[ s lome type of program logging requirements have existed virtually since the 
beginning of broadcast regulation."90 These logs have included advertiser 
information; broadcasters have kept records, available for public inspection 
as well as inspection by the FCC, that indicated commercials' 
86. See generally Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising 
as a Good or Bad, 108 Q.J. ECON. 941 (1993) (demonstrating that this understanding of 
advertising fits nicely within neoclassical economics). 
87. 47 U.S.C. § I 54(i) (1996) ("The Commission may perfonn any and all acts, make 
such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be 
necessary in the execution of its functions."). 
88. 47 U.S.c. § 303(j)( I 997)(The Commission shall "[h)ave authority to make general 
rules and regulations requiring stations to keep such records of programs, transmissions of 
energy, communications, or signals as it may deem desirable."). 
89. See id.; 47 U.S.c. § 154(1) (1997). 
90. In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment 
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 94 
F.C.C.2d 678, ~ 21 (1983). 
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"sponsors along with the time devoted to the commercial matter in 
question. ,,91 
While the program log requirements were largely lifted in the early 
1980s,92 the FCC's authority pursuant to the above-mentioned statutory 
sections, as well as the broad public trustee obligation, remain and continue 
to give the FCC the authority to require broadcasters to submit advertiser 
infonnation. The FCC, itself, could take this infonnation and collate it in a 
useful fonn, capable of easy computer search. The FCC has a proven ability 
to provide the public with large amounts of infonnation in useful formats.93 
This infonnation could be provided to consumers in a variety oflow-cost 
ways. As discussed in the following section, in order for this essay's proposed 
mandatory infonnation disclosure to be efficient, the costs of providing the 
infonnation must be sufficiently low. Posting it on the Internet would likely 
be a sufficiently low-cost way of providing the infonnation. This would be 
low-cost to the FCC to provide, and would be, in general, low-cost to 
consumers to access. Consumers could visit the FCC website and, with a 
relatively simple search, discover which advertisers buy time on which 
programs across the country. Such infonnation would empower consumers 
to support those programs and advertisers they like-and punish those 
advertisers who support programs they do not like. 
Posting the information during airtime would likely to be too expensive. 
On the other hand, with the widespread adoption of digital television, most 
viewers will have access to digital, real-time television guides, like those 
provided by Gemstar.94 These guides allow viewers, with a few remote 
control clicks, to access information about the programs they are watching. 
The FCC could certainly require carriage of advertiser information on these 
guides. 
91. In re Petition for Rulernaking to Require Broadcast Licensee to Maintain Certain 
Program Records, 44 F.C.C.2d 845, ~ 8 (1974). The programming log rules were found at 47 
C.F.R. §§ 73.286, 73.586, 73.670, 73.674 (broadcast), 47 C.F.R. § 73.112 (radio AM-specific 
rules), and 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.282, 73.582 (radio FM-specific rules). 
92. See In re Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981) (eliminating program log 
requirements for radio); In re The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 
Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television 
Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1075 (1984) (eliminating program log requirements for television 
stations). 
93. See generally Brown & Candeub, supra note 5. 
94. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: 
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, CS Doc. 97-80, Report & Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 
14775 (1998). 
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CONCLUSION: INFORMATION-BASED REGULATION, COMMUNITY 
STANDARDS, AND CIVIC SOCIETY 
929 
Numerous political scientists and legal scholars, often identified as 
"civic republicans," evaluate laws andlorpolitical systems based on the extent 
to which such laws/systems encourage discussion of important issues and 
widespread, broad-based involvement in political dialogue, producing-it is 
hoped-"civic virtue.,,9S Such dialogue will help clarify the basic principles of 
society, producing better principles and, perhaps more importantly, better 
citizens whom the process improves. 
Regardless of one's views on civic republicanism, it is clear that the 
current regulatory approach towards protecting children in the broadcast 
medium retards civic society and civic republican virtues. Interestingly, the 
FCC regulations that purport to protect children do not encourage discussion 
about what programming does, in fact, help to foster children's development. 
The children's television programming requirements do not allow parents to 
express their views or preferences about what types of programming are truly 
good for their children. The obscenity/indecency regulation purports to be 
about community standards, yet it is more often about Beltway politics and 
legal definitions and argument; individuals and individual communities have 
little to say on the matter. The V -chip makes the question of appropriate 
programming purely private. 
A market-based approach, on the other hand, would encourage and 
empower discussion about what should be policy for making a child-friendly 
broadcast media. It would lower the costs for citizens to learn about who is 
supporting what programs, encouraging citizens to use their consumer power 
to get programming that they want-presumably, programming more attentive 
and sensitive to children's needs. 
95. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 
1541 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18-19 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in 
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985). 
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